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PROBLEM STATEMENT
A shelter is to be designed to provide survival-level accommodations for up
to tbur astronauts for a maximum of five days. Protection against ionizing
radiation, and life-support must be provided. It would be used by astronauts who
were caught out in tile open by a solar flare event, or whose vehicle or other shelter
was unable to support and protect them.
Requirements:
House four people for five days.
Provide 20gm/cln 2 surface density shielding against ionizing radiation.
Provide life-support assuming that astronauts are wearing EVA stilts
that provide up to six hours of life-support with a two hour
extension.
PROJECT ORGANIZATION
DESIGN OVERVIEW
The lunar shelter design was largely based on adaptations of systems
cunently proposed for Space Station Freedom. Whenever possible, existing
technology was considered when selecting subsystems to satisfy each requirement.
The overall design requirement was broken down into eight major sections.
Each of these was then analyzed separately:
Major Subsystem Requirements
General structural design
Power
Radiation and Micro-meteorite protection
Lunar environment
Communications
Life support
Mobility
Airlock
All individual or small design team was assigned to each of these
subsystems. Consistency in design philosophy and compatibility of components
was 'ensured by frequent group meetings and monitoring by a project integration
lnanager.
The large number of subsystems made it impractical to study them
concurrently. The following schedule was therefore used:
DESIGN SCHEDULE
March
Geieral Structural Design
m
Apdl
1/31
Power/Fuel 3/9
Communication 3/9
r÷ Environmental Characteristics o
+
; Moon 3/11
Radiation/Meteorite Protection 3/11
÷ Mobility 3/11
t-l- Life Support 3/11
÷
I
-F
L÷
-Heat Trans =er
-Environmental Control
/
-Food, Watt!r, & Waste
i
!
Aidock 3/16
Fire Suppression 3 16
i
-- Ergonomics 3/16 I
_}7_1 System IntegratlonsJ 3/18
Detailed Design,
Artwork 4/7
Due Date 4/12
MAJOR SPECIFICATIONS
The LSES shall be designed to provide survival-level accommodations for
four astronauts for up to five days.
It shall be ready for use at short notice and be transportable to a working
site.
Protection shall be provided against solar radiation produced as a result of
a 200MeV solar event, based on a 15 REM maximum dose.
Tile shelter shall be mobile, compact and self-contained such that astronauts
on long-range excursions will have constant access to it. Accordingly, it will be
swiftly deployable and accessible with tile minimum of preparation.
The structure must be able to withstand tile lunar environlnent, notably tile
steep temperature gradients that exist between sun and shade, micro-meteorite
bombardment and lunar dust particles.
The shelter shall be self-contained with an independent power supply and
communication system. The astronauts will therefore not be required to leave the
shelter during a solar event to obtain equipment from the primary lunar vehicle.
Storage shall be supplied for all necessary supplies and equipment.
Communication ability shall be provided with EVA suits in the near vicinity,
the hmar base and, via the base, Earth.
Life-support and the ability to pressurize the living space shall be included
to conserve EVA suit supplies. This will also allow helmets and suits to be
removed, if necessary, for eating, drinking and first-aid.
The design shall be based on minimal use of Earth materials and minimum
construction and maintenance time.
ASSUMPTIONS
The investigation and design of each subsystem of the TLS required that
several assulnptions be made concerning the technology and equipmel_t that will
be available at the time of use:
A lunar base exists which has communication with Earth and can act as a
relay station for communications from the shelter. This equipment is fully
operational, serviceable and independent of TLS operation. Also, a lunar
vehicle exists which is capable of towing the shelter.
Equipment at this base includes lifting machinery capable of removing the
shelter from the lunar lander upon its arrival at the lunar surface. Excavation
equipment and a regolith conveyor will also be required to provide lunar soil
for shielding.
Maximum required range of the shelter is set at 1000km in any direction
from the lunar base.
Satellites and/or space stations exist for relay of communications signals.
Linking with these platfonns is readily available and fiflly adaptable. Initial
audio and telemetry data rate is set at 250 kbps. This rate is supported by
all communication links comprising the system.
Launch from Earth will be aboard the proposed Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle
(HLLV). The internal payload dimensions are 10re.diameter by 8.5m m
length. Maximnm mass is 33,000kg. A trans-hmar booster and lunar lander
stage will be provided.
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY
Each subsystem analysis required that decisions be made between a number
of possible alternatives. These decisions were based on a design philosophy that
was decided upon by all melnbers of the design team. Each separate section
required unique guidelines to be adopted for that particular application. However,
ally decision had to agree with the following:
Tile over-riding design consideration was safety. Multiple redundancy, use
of proven equipment and non-complex lnechanisms were used whenever
possible.
Existing technology was used whenever possible to minimize the need for
technological innovation and the related expense. Similarly, equipment will
be suitable for adapting and upgrading.
Maintenance requirements were kept minimal to decrease the time required
to service the shelter and the additional parts that would be required from
Earth.
Provisions and equipment were based on the minimum required for comfort
and safety. The shelter is for emergency use only and will therefore not
warrant 'additional extras'. This minimized cost, reduced complexity and
contributed to reliability.
LUNAR ENVIRONMENT
INTRODUCTION
The lunar environment is a serious obstacle to overcome in order to have a
successful emergency shelter. Environmental characteristics, such as the
temperature characteristics, soil properties and radiation intensities are important
facts to consider, so that the design of the lunar shelter can withstand these lunar
elements. This section provides environmental information, relevant to the
construction of a mobile, lunar emergency shelter.
LUNAR CHARACTERISTICS
Gravity. (I/6 of Earth's gravity at Equator): 1.62 m/sec 2
Escape Velocity: 5000 miles/hour
Inclination of equator: 6 41'
Albedo: 0.073 (spherical)
The moon reflects up to 70% of sunlight
Mass (1/81 that of Earth's mass): 7.3458x1025 gm (5.0344x10 z_ slugs)
Mean Diameter:
Mean Density:
2160 miles (3476 kilometers)
3.3402 gm/cm 3 (6.4822slugs/fl 3)
Surface Area: 37.9x106 kin 2
Moment of inertia: 0.395/kg m 2
Heat flow (average): 29 mW/m z
Lunar rock types: Ferroan Anorthosities (most common),
Kreep (High potassium and rare earth elements) and Mare Basalt
The lunar seas (Maria) occupy about 40% of the lunar disc
LUNAR ATMOSPHERE
2x10 5 lnolecules/cm 3 (at night)
lxlO 4 molecules/cm 3 (at day)
Constituents: H 2 , 4He, 2°Ne, 36Ar, 4°Ar
DAYTIME LUNAR ATMOSPHERE
Species Density (molecules/cm 3)
H 2 0.12x10 s
H20 1.4x 105
CO 2 1.4-3.4x105
Various 0.1 x 105
Total 3.0-5.0x 10 s
Hydrogen is constantly blown off the surface- 3.9x104 Hydrogen atoms/cm 3
Water Vapor: As a result of each solar wind proton shower, 0.036 H20
molecules are released from the lunar surface. Escape rate to space is 1.4x105
molecules/cm 3.
ABSTRACT
The Lunar Surface Emergency Shelter (LSES) is designed to provide
survival-level accommodations for up to four astronauts for a maxilnum of five
days. It would be used by astronauts who were caught out in the open during a
large solar event.
The habitable section consists of an aluminum pressure shell with an ilmer
diameter of 6ft. and a length of 12.2ft. Access is through a 4in. thick ahnninum
airlock door mounted at the rear of the shelter. Shielding is provided by a 14.9in.
thick layer of ltmar regolith contained within a second, outer aluminum shell. This
provides protection against a 200MeV event, based on a 15 REIV1 maximum dose.
The shelter is self-contained with a maximum range of 1000km. Power is
supplied by a primary fuel cell which occupies 70.7fl 3 of the interior volume.
Mobility is achieved by towing the shelter behind existing hmar vehicles.
It was assumed that a fully operational, independent lunar base was available
to provide communication support and tools for set-up and maintenance.
Transportation to the moon would be provided by the proposed Heavy Lift Launch
Vehicle.
'Major design considerations for the LSES were safety, reliability and
minimal use of Earth materials.
THERMAL ESCAPE TIMES FROM MOON TO e -_ OF
INITIAL CONCENTRATION
Gas T = 150 K (cold side) T = 400 K (hot side)
H 5100 seconds 3600 seconds
H 2 104 seconds 4100 seconds
He 200 hours 9700 seconds
O 101° years 1.4 years
02 10 26 years 106 years
H20 101_ years 60 years
CO2 1037 years 10 m years
Due to the lack of atlnosphere there is 11o light scatter, absorption or thermal
convection.
LUNAR TEMPERATURE
104 - 390 K at equator
80 K at the poles (dawn)
Mean temperature at a depth of 35 cm is 45 K higher than at the surface
Change in temperature between atmosphere and ground is 50 K.
Thermal Conductivity of hmar soil:
1.5x10 -5 W/cm 2 for top 1-2 cm
5-7 times greater below 2 cm
LUNAR SOIL
Tile dust that covers the surface of the moon is called regolith. The coverage
is estimated at an average depth of 4 meters.
Regolith grain sizes: 45 - 100 um
Soil adherent characteristics on specific surfaces:
Painted Surfaces: 104 dynes/cm 2
Metallic snrfaces: (2-3)x103 dynes/cm 2
Penneability of soil to 25 cm: (1-7)x10 -12 m 2
RADIATION ENVIRONMENT
Solar Wind: 1 Key/ainu
Penetration Depth: 10 cm
Proton Flux: 108/cruZ/sec
Solar Flares: 1 - 100 Mev/amu
Penetration Depth: 1 cm
Proton Flux: 102/cm2/sec
Cosmic Rays: l0 z - l04 Mev/amu
Penetration Depth: 300 cm
Proton Flux: 1/cm2/sec
hnpact velocities ofmicrometeorite bombardment: 2.4-72 km/sec
OVERALL STRUCTURE
DETERMINATION OF GENERAL SHAPE
AND STRUCTURE OF SHELTER
Before subsystems were designed to satisfy the given requirements, a general
consensus amongst the design team had to be reached concerning the overall shape
and structure of the shelter. Determination of shielding teclmiques and materials
would have a large effect on the final design. However, it was necessary to reach
agreement about the basic format of the shelter before the suitability of a system
could be considered.
To satisfy' the given requirements, the shelter could be either permanent,
temporary or fully mobile. A permanent shelter would be constructed, in advance,
at the anticipated site where it would be required. It would then act as an outpost
which, although constantly available, would have limited use within a wide range.
A temporary shelter would be constructed at each work-site and then dismantled
when the site was abandoned. A fully mobile shelter would require no assembly
but would either have to be towed or independently powered.
The decision of mobility was decided upon using the following factors:
Set-up time
, Versatility to surroundings
Suitability for pressurization
Suitability for shielding
Criteria
Set-up time
Versatility
Pressurization
Shielding
MOBILITY
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The suitability of a particular shape for the shelter was decided upon using
the tbllowmg parameters:
Suitability for pressurization
Usethi volume
Ease of transportation to the Moon
Mobility on the lunar surface
Ease of assembly
Proportion of surface exposed to radiation for a given habitable volume
Ergonomics
Four alternatives were considered: Cubic, cylindrical, spherical and wheels
(using hollow wheels as one-man shelters). A cubic shelter was used as the datum.
Criteria
Pressurized
Usefill volume
Transportation
Mobility
Constn, ction
Exposed surface
Ergonomics
OVERALL SHAPE
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As may be seen, a cylindrical shelter was superior or equal in suitability to
the datum. The wheels were found to be unsuitable for pressurization, have little
useable volume and be impractical for the required duration. A sphere was the
most suitable shape for pressurization and had the minimum surface area but was
found to be difficult to construct and adapt to mobility.
Therefore, it was decided to make tile shelter cylindrical and fiflly mobile.
EARTH-TO-MOON
TRANSPORTATION
IN-SPACE TRANSPORTATION
MISSION SCENARIO
It was assumed that tile LSES would be launched from Earth aboard a single
stage heavy lift launch vehicle (HLLV) such as that currently under consideration
by NASA. After reaching a low Earth orbit (LEO) a trans-ltmar injection (TLI)
stage would provide the thrust to move out of orbit and head towards the moon.
The burned-up TLI stage would be disposed of en-route, leaving a lunar lander
stage which would perform the final descent to the lunar surface.
• Stage Separation
# "/ Trans Lunar Injection
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Lunar Surface
Earth-to-Moon transportation scenario
Size, weight and shape of the shelter were therefore based on approximations
of the inaximunl capabilities of the proposed HLLV and lunar lander [1]. The
large available diameter of the HLLV allows the shelter to be launched and landed
on tile moon in a horizontal position. This eliminates the need tbr excessive
strengdlening in the axial direction and also simplifies deployment once on the
lunar surface. The cradle interface to the lunar lander will also serve as the
structural interface to the mobility system. Points of attachment on this cradle will
allow it to be hoisted off of the lander using equipment already at the lunar base.
Assembly of the shielding will then have to be completed by filling the
exterior aluminum shell with fine regolith from the lunar surface. This, too, will
be achieved using equipment already in place at the hmar base sucll as a conveyor
and shovels. The regolith will be raised to the top of the shelter where regularly
spaced openings will allow it to be poured into the cells of the honeycomb polymer
structure within the outer aluminum shell.
SUBSYSTEM DESIGN
RADIATION AND MICRO-METEORITE
PROTECTION
RADIATION AND MICRO-METEORITE PROTECTION
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RADIATION TERMINOLOGY
The problem definition states that the lunar shelter must protect the
astronauts fiom 25 rein per month. The reln is defined as Roentgen Equivalent
Man where one rem is the dosage of any ionizing radiation that will cause the same
amount of biological inju_ to human tissue as one roentgen of X-ray or gamma-
ray dosage. The rem is obtained by multiplying the physical radiation dose (rad)
[the amount of energy deposited per unit mass of material] by an energy-dependent
quality factor. In this study, the quality factor used in the conversion of physical
dose to dose equivalent is that recommended in reference [2].
The use of the megaelectron volt (MeV) is also used extensively in the
report. The MeV is a unit of energy and is equivalent to 1.602x10 13 Joules.
The required thickness of the radiation shielding for the lunar shelter was
expressed in inches. However, shielding is sometimes expressed in terms of its
areal density. For example, a shielding requirement may suggest the use of 20
g/cm 2 of water to effectively protect the crew.
SOLAR FLARES
Unlike on Earth, Itmar inhabitants will llOt have the protective cover of an
atmosphere or magnetic-field regions as shields against radiation from outer space.
More precisely, the two primary sources of radiation exposure in space are:
l)
2)
Galactic Cosmic Rays
Solar particle events which consist of high energy protons,
X-rays, gamma rays, electrons, and neutrons.
Galactic cosmic rays must only be considered for missions 4 to 6 months or
longer, Ref [2]. Observations have also shown that if the shielding against the high
energy, protons is effective, the absorbed doses from other solar radiation are not
significant.t3] Therefore, fifll attention has been placed on protecting the astronauts
from solar flare events composed of high energy protons.
In order to protect the astronauts from solar flares, data had to be acquired
on the energy possessed by protons in large solar flare events. The three largest
solar flare events recorded in the last half century are:
1956: produced one tenth the protons as the 1972 flare, but delivered
far more protons than other flares.
1960: exhibited characteristics intermittent to the others.
1972: produced the most protons but had fewer protons with energies
greater than the other two events.
In order to protect the astronauts from the possibility of such a large scale
solar flare, the hmar emergency shelter should be designed to provide shielding
against events like those described above. A graph of tim time-integrated proton
flux spectra for the three listed solar flare evens can be seen in the following
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Time-integrated proton flux spectra for three anomalously
large solar proton events
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS ON RADIATION AND
MICRO-METEORITE PROTECTION
Statement of Need
An emergency hmar surface shelter is to be designed to house tip to four
astronauts for up to five days. The astronauts would seek refuge inside the shelter
when there was an occurrence of a solar flare event or their vehicle or other shelter
was unable to support and protect them. In addition to radiation protection, the
shelter structure would help protect against the unlikely event of micro-meteorite
impacts. The basic problem for the radiation protection team was to design a lunar
shelter capable of protecting astronauts from a large solar flare event like those
stated on the previous page. Design specifications and specific requirements are
outlined and listed below.
Design Requirements
Due to the high cost of transporting materials into space, the radiation shield
should be designed as compact and light weight as possible while providing
maximum radiation and thermal protection.
"The radiation shield should be kept simple thereby making it reliable.
The radiation shield should be capable of providing the astronauts with
protection at any given instant. The shield should be able to be deployed quickly
because high energy protons from the sun can reach the moon in less than ten
minutes.
The shield should be designed so that it will be ready to protect the
astronauts from the possibility of a solar flare event when they are away from the
permanent hmar base. Therefore the shield can not depend on machinery to ready
it for a proton shower thereby increasing its simplicity.
The radiation shelter should minimize the need for new teclmology by using
existing designs when possible.
Tile shield should not interfere with mobility. Therefore a very large and
massive structure should not be used. A design with has a relatively low center of
gravity should be used to minimize the possibility that the shelter would tip over
while in transport over the rugged lunar surface.
From an economical standpoint, tile use of lunar materials should be utilized
instead of material that needs to be transported to the Moon from Earth.
The radiation shelter must be designed to withstand pressurization so that the
astronauts can take off their space suits.
The shelter should be designed so that it is simple to operate under
emergency conditions.
The radiation shield should have low maintenance because the astronauts will
not be able to exit the shelter during a proton shower.
Due to extreme temperature changes that occur on the lunar surface, the
shielding material and design must be able to withstand the induced thermal stress
and strain encountered in such an enviromnent.
Structural materials should be selected with corrosion protection in mind,
along with strength and durability characteristics.
STATUS OF THE REQUIREMENTS ON
RADIATION PROTECTION
Requirement
25 rem/month protection to BFO
Four person habitable environment
Minimize cost
Minimize weight
Thermal protection
Simple in design and construction
Status
Use of A1 and regolith as shielding
300 f13 habitable volume
Use existing tectmology and regolith
Use of regolith, has a density = 1.5g/cm 3
Use of regolith and carbon felt to
insulate crew compartment from
temperatures ranging from -200°F to
200°F (shade vs. direct exposure to sun)
Shield consists of few,
non-moving parts
Dependable
Quickly deployable
Minimize the need for new technology
Allow mobility
Shield always ready to
protect since the shield
is pre-furbished at the
permanent lunar base.
Shield is pre-filrbished
at the permanent lunar
base.
Shield consists of A1
and regolith
Size and weight has been
minimized, low center of
gravity has been achieved
using a cylinder.
Requirement
Use of hmar materials
Allow for pressurization
Simple to operate in emergency
Low maintenance
Status
Regolith supplies some
radiation and thennai
shielding.
Alummuln structure
will be capable of
withstanding the 101 kPa
cabin pressure.
Shelter requires no
initial setup by the
astronauts since it
has been pre-furbished
at the hmar base.
Shield does not
depend on any
machinery or moving
parts which must be
periodically checked
and maintained.
Design 2.
The second design basically consisted of an thin outer alunlinum cylinder
which contained a second, thick walled, aluminum cylinder inside of the first, as
shown in the figure below.
Design 2 - Mobile Shelter
The smaller cylinder would serve as the living quarters for the four
astronauts. It would be supported by an aluminum truss substructure placed at
equal distances along the length of the emergency shelter. Sifted regolith will be
placed between the outer and ilmer cylinders as the primary shielding material.
Regolith can be placed in position by fill ports at the top of the shelter. The
regolith will not only provide the necessary radiation shielding, it will also serve
as a thermal insulation medium and shock wave attenuation material. An objective
behind the use of regolith was to minimize the number of materials that had to be
transported to the Moon. In order to protect the astronauts from radiation exposure
larger than 25 rem/lnonth (produced by the three largest solar flares recorded in the
last half centuw), a regolith thickness of approximately 44 cm will be required.
See appendix A for specific design calculations.
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DESIGN SYNTHESIS
Four designs were considered for radiation shielding against the three largest
solar flare events in the last half century. The incorporation of ideas from the first
three proposed designs led to the fourth and final design for the radiation shield.
Design 1:
The first design was a permanent shelter made of a thick aluminum cylinder
buried by regolith, as depicted in the figure below. The thick layer of regolith is
used as the radiation shielding material. This particular design posed questions as
to the ability of the astronauts to use such a facility in the event they were on a
mission that placed theln at a great distance from the shelter. In this event, the
astronauts would have to return to the shelter quickly. This design would be
acceptable if it were not for the fact that the mode of transportation to the shelter
could fail, thus leaving the astronauts in a situation of great peril. Because of this
potential for disaster, this design was eliminated and replaced with one that allowed
|nobility.
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Design 1-Permanent Shelter depiction
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Tile obvious problem with this particular design is the large mass of regolith
required, as moving such a large and massive structure would be difficult. Possible
problems with the substructure were also of concern because the COlmecting points
will experience cyclic fatigue due to thermal expansion and contraction. Other
shielding materials used in conjunction with regolith would reduce the required
thickness of the shield. This concept was employed in the third design.
Design 3:
The third design utilized the basic structure of the second design except the
aluminum truss structure would be replaced by a polyethylene honeycomb which
is impregnated with Till 2. The reason the for using such a material can be found
in reference [5]. This report on High Effectiveness Shielding Materials and
Optimal Shield Design, states that the shielding ability of the new polynated
materials are fotmd to be highly superior to that of the shielding materials in
common use. The use of these new materials will allow for the reduction in shield
thickness and total mass. Because polyethylene has a low density and is a
hydrogenous material, it would serve as an ideal radiation shield. The honeycomb
structure would have two primary functions: first, its geometrical shape would serve
as a strong substructure and second, its cell shape design would provide an optimal
shock wave attenuation barrier. The honeycomb cells would be filled with regolith
on the Moon in order to maximize radiation protection and to add additional
structural strength by filling the cell voids.
Questions were posed as to the strength of the polyethylene when considering
the extreme temperatnre differences present on the Moon's surface. The surface
temperature of the shelter facing the sun will average 200°F (93°C), while the
shaded side will average -200°F( - 128°C). Because the polyethylene is impregnated
with another material, this caused concern as to separation of material and crack
propagation. For these reasons, a different structural design must be proposed in
order to guard against possible structural problems.
Design 4.
The final design1 incorporated ideas from the above three design proposals.
The outer and imler shell will be 1/2 inch (1.27 cm) thick aluminum-titanium alloy
(AI 2219). Between the two cylinders lies 14.9 inches of a regolith filled
honeycomb structure. The typical shield section diagram shows these design
parameters. The aluminum will provide a rigid structure while the honeycomb will
act as a substructure and provide micrometeorite protection. With this
configuration, the radiation shield will have a mass of 8402.99 kg; see appendices.
(Note that this calculation does not include weight considerations for the end
sections, suspension, filrnishings, equipment, or supplies) The polyethylene should
no longer be ilnpregnated with the TiH2 and will be a uniform material. The main
reason for choosing this alternative is that the overall effectiveness of the Till 2 is
not clear for this type of application. The report mentioned is based on galnma ray
absorption and not proton flux. Because of the potential of the loss of human life,
a decision was made that the shielding would provide the proper protection without
making tnmecessary assumptions. The assumption that was avoided was the
relation of shielding thickness to effective radiation protection on the part of the
Till2 component. As stated in the report mentioned above, the results of the
calculations presented should not be taken to represent realistic shield design and
performance. When fi_rther research shows that titanium hydride is truly superior
to conventional material, the final design can be changed to one that includes Till 2.
To minimize the effects of thermal fatigue, an insulating material should be
placed between the outer shell and the honeycomb structure. Thick carbon felt
material (about 0.5 inches (1.27cm)) will provide the necessary thermal protection
for the polyethylene structure. With this configuration, the polyethylene
substructure will have protection from extreme thermal fluctuations. Regolith will
still be used to fill the cell voids. The regolith can be installed into the shelter
through fill ports at the top of the shelter. The process of installing the regolith
would involve either a pumping method or a conveyor type transport to the fill
ports" at the top of the shelter. As stated earlier, the regolith will add to the
effectiveness of the radiation shielding and strength of the structure. Because the
regolith will not be in place during transport to the Moon, it will be necessary to
add a supporting substructure at the ends of the shelter. The shelter substructure
diagram that follows details the ends of the shelter. The design of the access door
can possibly take care of the support at that end of the shelter. All calculations
concerning the shielding and material thickness are contained in appendix B.
Radiation dose calculations were made by Reference [2] and Reference [3]
using the BYNTRN computer codes. The BYNTRN code solves the Boltzmann
transport equation, taking into account all energy dependencies and scattering
interactions. This code is used when detailed dose calculations are required.
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Tile fburth design gives protection from the most pressing problems. Those
problems are radiation, decompression, and hypervelocity (velocities above 5000
ft/sec (1524 m/s)) impacts. Even though meteorite impacts are highly improbable,
they need to be addressed because the occupants of the shelter are many thousands
of miles from safety.
The overall radiation shielding is a composite. This composite consists of
the aluminum structure, regolith and polyethylene honeycomb. The colnbination
of these materials reduces the mass of the structure while increasing the efficiency
of the shielding. The honeycomb structure in combination with the regolith
provides some protection, however minimal, against hypervelocity projectiles. The
calculations concerning the shielding thickness and hoop stress evaluations are
contained in appendix B.
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INTRODUCTION TO MOBILITY
The mobility of the LSES can be considered an important safety feature.
This mobility allows the astronauts to leave the base on extended lunar excursions
with the security of having full radiation shielding and life support systems within
close proximity.
Tile following section is an analysis of the mobility options available tbr the
LSES. Some of the design considerations are similar to those for an earth vehicle,
but the Moon's enviromnent presents some additional requirements. The main
factors in mobility include terrain and soil mechanics, mobility objective, and
vehicle load.
The mobility of the LSES can be separated into three main systems:
Tracking System
Suspension System
Transport System
Each system will be evaluated according to the requirements that shall be
presented in the following section. The overall design summary appears at the end
of this section.
INTRODUCTION TO TRACKING
A vehicle will move across the ground only if tile ground can support its
weight without much resistance to motion. This motion has a vertical component,
"flotation", and a horizontal component, "traction". Too much traction creates a
bulldozing effect, while not enough traction promotes free-rolling of the vehicle.[6]
These two factors are particularly important in the mobility of the LSES.
It has been detennined that the Moon's regolith can support a contact
pressure of 7 to 10 kPa.[7] Therefore, the surface area of the tracking system must
be large enough to support the weight of the emergency shelter.
REQUIREMENTS FOR TRACKING SYSTEM
The contact area of the tracking system must provide adequate flotation for
hmar gravitational conditions to prevent sinkage into the loose regolith.
The tracking system must resist a free-rolling motion that is promoted by the
uneven hmar terrain.
The vehicle will be required to traverse the uneven lunar terrain while
maintaining control and remaining in contact with the ground as much as possible.
The tracking system must avoid accumulation of lunar regolith which could
prevent normal fimctioning
This system should be able to absorb a portion of the dynamic load created
by the uneven terrain.
,l
i
The overall design must be relatively simple and ensure ease of maintenance
and repair.
The materials used must remain flexible tlu'oughout the temperature range of
-240 to 220 F.
INTRODUCTION TO SUSPENSION
Since the shelter is going to be mobile, it is necessary to design a suspension
system to prevent excessive jolting that could damage the interior equipment or the
vehicle itself. The demands on a lunar suspension system are similar to those on
earth. It needs to provide support for bouncing and a damping effect to.
compensate for the lower gravitation field on the Moon.
REQUIREMENTS FOR SUSPENSION SYSTEM
The suspension system must be able to absorb the dynamic load associated
with the uneven terrain. This dynamic load will be partially absorbed (passively)
by the tracking system.
Because of the uneven hmar surface, the suspension system should provide
independent components to help maintain contact with the ground.
Lunar dust must be prevented from interfering with the system.
The suspension system is also responsible for preventing the vehicle from
bottoming out during hmar excursions.
The materials and technology used must be compatible with the overall
design goal of weight minimization.
INTRODUCTION TO TRANSPORT
Tile purpose of tile transport system is to ensure that tile astronauts can easily
reach the LSES in the case of a solar flare or other emergency. In other words,
this system defines the means by which the shelter can travel to any place the
astronauts call travel.
REQUIREMENTS FOR TRANSPORT SYSTEM
This system will ensure that tile temporary shelter is within the range for
astronauts to reach in case of emergency.
The transport design should be light weight, relatively simple, and ensure
ease of maintenance and repair.
Tile method of transportation should also minimize power usage for the
LSES and be compatible with other hmar vehicles.
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION PRINCIPLES
Each system was analyzed according to existing technology, and several
alternatives were investigated to detennine the best solution principle. The
following is an outline of the alternative solution principles for each system.
Tracking System
Wheels
Jointed Legs
Track
Suspension System
Mechanical
Magnetic
Transport System
Internally Powered
Externally Powered
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
TRACKING SYSTEM
WHEELS: Wheels are extremely reliable and mechanically efficient, making theln
the preferred mobility option for many missions. There are various wheel types
and sizes that can be used, but they have a limited surface contact area.
JOINTED LEGS: Jointed leg locomotion systems are extremely complex in nature.
They are plagued by large dynamic loads and non-unifonn motion, making them
inefficient in their energy usage. The potential for jointed legs lies ill their ability
to traverse extremely uneven terrain, such as a three foot vertical step.
TRACK: Track locomotion systems are well suited for use on the lunar surface.
Their large surface contact area increases performance and flotation characteristics.
Tracks on earth have a high frequency of breakdown, which can only be corrected
by making them very heavy and sturdy. A tracked system is also complicated in
design.
SUSPENSION SYSTEM
MECHANICAL: Mechanical suspension systems are the most commonly used
systems because of their simplicity, dependability, and cost. A combination of one
or more of the following make up a mechanical suspension system: torsion bars,
springs, dampers, struts and shock absorbers.
MAGNETIC: Magnetic suspension systems are still
phase. Two examples of this complex technology
permanent magnet cores.[8]
in the conceptual design
are superconductive and
TRANSPORT SYSTEM
INTERNALLY POWERED: An active transport system has its own power supply
and steering system. This type of system has the advantage of operating
independent from any other vehicle.
EXTERNALLY POWERED: All externally powered transport system is a passive
and relies on another vehicle fbr travel. The main design parameter for this type
of system is the means of attachment of the two vehicles.
STATUS OF REQUIREMENTS
FOR TRACKING SYSTEM
Requirement
Contact Pressure less than
10 kPa
Maintain Ground Contact
Avoid Dust Acculnulation
Absorb Dynamic Load
Simple Design/Maintenance
Maintain Flexibility
Resist Free-roiling
Status
Met: With six wheels, each having a
ground contact area of 0.43 m 2, the
contact pressure is 9.4 kPa.
Met: The flexure of the wheels will
improve the level of control and help
maximize ground contact.
Met: The mylar cover that surrounds the
wheel will guard against hmar dust
buildup.
Met: A major purpose of designing
flexible wheels is to absorb a portion of
the dynamic load. This in a sense makes
the wheels a part of the suspension system.
Met: Utilizing the existing teclmology for
the tracking system increases simplicity
and dependability.
Met: This factor influenced the material
selection for the wheels. Kevlar 49 will
maintain sufficient flexibility for the lunar
temperature ranges.
Met: The wheel design accotmts for
sufficient contact area to resist a free-
rolling motion.
STATUS OF REQUIREMENTS
FOR SUSPENSION SYSTEM
Requirement
Avoid Dust Accumulation
Absorb Dynamic Load
Maximize Ground Contact
Weight Minimization
Maintain Flexibility
Status
Met: The protective sleeve around the
suspension system will prevent lunar dust
from entering the system.
Met: The torsion bar suspension system
will enable the shelter to be towed over the
uneven hmar terrain with minimal
deflection of the chassis and intenlal
components.
Met: Having independent suspension for
each wheel will improve the vehicle's
handling and control by maxilnizing
ground contact.
Met: Hollow shafts are used wherever
possible.
Met: The material used will become more
rigid in the colder temperature range but
will maintain adequate flexibility.
STATUS OF REQUIREMENTS
FOR TRANSPORT SYSTEM
Requirement
Close to Astronauts
Light Weight
Minimize Power Usage
Status
Met: Since the shelter can be towed by
another hmar vehicle, the astronauts will
have easy access to the LSES in case of
emergency.
Met: The decision to design the shelter to
be towed was highly governed by the
weight minimization goal. The additional
constraint, however, is that another lunar
vehicle must be capable of pulling this
additional mass.
Met: The LSES requires less power since
the transport system is passive (being
towed).
TRACKING DESIGN
Wheels were chosen as the best solution principle for tile tracking system.
In the past, they have proven to be an excellent mobility choice for lunar mobility
systems. Wheels are mechanically efficient, can be designed into light weight
systems, and provide excellent reliability.[9] Jointed legs were ruled out because
of their mechanical complexity, and a tracked vehicle was ruled out to minimize
weight and add simplicity.
The wheels were modeled after the design for the 1990 Lunar Articulated
Remote Transportation System.[10] This design was selected for its relative
simplicity, improved ground contact for control, light weight, and dependability.
The wheels are a hemispherical shell, supported on the inside by an array of curved
ribs, as shown in the wheel diagram. Traction is accomplished by the stainless
steel wire mesh and the fiberglass reinforced cleat.
The use of wire mesh reduces weight and increases the coefficient of friction
to promote rolling as opposed to sliding. The cleats are in the shape of an inverted
'V' to fi_rther prevent the shelter from sliding in any direction. The wheel spacing
and maximum roll angle were calculated by the scaled drawing below. The bottom
of the chassis was assumed to be at the centreline height of the wheel base. This
assembly provides a maximum roll angle of 38 degrees, well above the expected
angles to be traversed. Both the shell and ribs shall be made of Kevlar 49 (with
a protective radiation coating). This material is ideal for maintaining flexibility
over the extreme temperature ranges of the Moon.
Protection from lunar dust will come from the Mylar cover. Since the
buildup of this dust could interfere with the normal functioning of the system, the
cover is an important safety factor m the design. Mylar was selected for its light
weight, flexibility, and ability to coat other materials for protection.
Wheels have tremendous versatility, including size, configuration, and
number. Because of the weight associated with the radiation shielding material, six
hemispherical wheels are needed to best fit the design requirements. Both two and
four wheeled systems were considered, but neither provided adequate contact area
to support the shelter within reasonable dimensions. These calculations are shown
in Appendix C.
The main problem with wheels m terrestrial, all-terrain applications is their
small "tbotprint". The Moon's regolith can support a maximum contact pressure
of 10 kPa. With the estimated shelter weight of 18 kN (3 kN per wheel), the
optimal wheel dimensions were determined as shown in the wheel drawing. An
increased contact area increases the rolling resistance, but lowers the bulldozing
resistance. Therefore, the ideal contact area involves a balance between these two
factors.
d =2.64 m
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SUSPENSION DESIGN
A lnechanical suspension system was chosen over a magnetic type. The
underlying factors in this decision include weight and power minimization, cost,
and simplicity. Since the LSES will not be manned when in motion, the improved
comfort level associated with the other two technologies is not a major constraint.
The primary functions of the suspension system are to absorb the dynamic
load associated with the uneven terrain and to prevent the bottoming out of the
vehicle. The flexible wheels will only take care of a small portion of these
problems.
The chosen suspension system is a torsion bar mechanism, the reason for
using this type of suspension is based on simplicity, ease of maintenance,
reliability, and ease of implementation into the overall design of the chassis. In
addition, this type of design will allow for simple and quick modifications
according to the hmar terrain to be traversed. Furthermore, this system provides
a low center of gravity which is necessary to help prevent roll.
The chosen six wheel configuration requires the suspension to accomodate
a suitable towing system. This system requires that the rear axle be stationary and
the front two axles pivot; one pivot point for each axle. A suspension system using
coil springs or leaf springs would be impractical due to the complexity of the
resulting system, in addition to multiple possible modes of failure. Refer to the
suspension layout diagram for system outline.
Each of the six wheels will have its own suspension system. These
independent components will provide lnaximum ground contact for the variable
lunar terrain which, in turn, will maximize control and safety in hmar excursions.
A flexible mylar cover is designed to protect the torsion bar system from the
accumulation of lunar dust. This device will not add any significant weight and
will increase the lifetime and reliability of the suspension system.
The suspension layout diagram shows the location of the four load bearing
areas. The two shown on the fixed axle are rigid supports for the hmar shelter
chassis. The two circular load bearing areas consist of four rigid plates; one
motmted to each axle and one mounted to the hmar shelter chassis, each load
bearing area must be sufficiently large to withstand the resulting moment induced
Wheel Configuration /I_ h
for Each Axle I
J
I
Load Bearing
Areas
-- LSES
REAR
Fixed Axle
Suspension layout
by tile torsion bar suspension and/or inclined terrain, the moment induced by the
torsion bar susension can be compensated for by translating the load to a position
above the spindle. Steering attitude of the middle axle is accomplished by two sets
of steering linkages attached to the front axle. The length and positioning of the
steering linkage can be adjusted to provide the proper steering angles.
The torsion bars are designed to lock into position using a hexagonal
configuration oll one end (refer to the torsion bar diagram). A retaining pin is used
to fix the torsion bar in place. A pliable protective dust cover is placed at the end
of the axle to prevent the lunar dust from entering the brass bushing insert. The
bushings are necessary to minimize frictional wear between the torsion bars and
each axle. The appropriate wheel base dimension shoulkd be sufficiently large to
avoid intereference between the wheels and chassis.
/-- Spindle
Torsion Bar Typical Cross-Section
as Viewed from the End
/
End Cross-Sect ion /
/ of_/
Retaining Pin
Machine for a Brass Bushing
Insert (Press Fit)
Protective Mylar Cover
Dust Cover Straps
Torsion bar configuration
Under static load conditions, the torsion bar position will be approximately
45 degrees from the horizontal; see range of motion diagram. In this position, the
spring rate or spring constant will not be linear for positions approaching 90
degrees. As long as the twing speed is below approximately 15 mph (24.1 kph),
there should not be a need for dynamic damping devices. All wheels are specified
to have sealed bearings with protective dust covers. The two front load beating
surfaces are to be teflon coated to minimize friction and wear. The pivot points
will have large machined pros to transmit the towing forces. At these pivot
locations, sealed roller bearings will again be used. Dust covers will be needed for
the circular load bearing areas. Specifications for the dust covers will include
having the capability to rotate with the motion of the towing bar.
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Tile chassis is in the form of a cradle onto which the cylindrical shelter is
attached (see front profile). It consists of seven curved beams which follow the
curvature of the cylinder plus three straight beams which run along the length of
the chassis, connecting the curved pieces. The chassis is constructed of the same
aluminium-titanium alloy as was used for the shelter walls. This material was
selected for its high strength-to-weight ratio and weldability. By attaching the
cradle in many locations, tensile and compressive loads can be well distributed
throughout the entire structure.
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\
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\
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\
Steering Linkage Connections
LSES
Protective Dust Cover
Front Profile
TRANSPORT DESIGN
The transport system consists of a simple ball and socket hitch with slight
modifications (curved edges) to allow some vertical pivoting. This mobility will
allow the astronauts to leave the base for extended lunar excursions with the
security of having full radiation shielding and life support systems within close
proximity.
The hitch is made of the same aluminum as the chassis. Weight is
minilnized by this passive transport system, since the power and steering systems
are located on the vehicle that will do the towing. There is a trade off in that less
power is required by the LSES, but the towing vehicle will require more power.
HITCH DESIGN
The connecting bitch between the LSES and the towing vehicle must allow
for pitching, yawing and rolling relative to the two vehicles. This is accomplished
with a ball and socket joint. The following design allows for 30 degrees of yaw
(turning in the horizontal plane), 30 degrees of pitch (vertical plane) and 360
degrees of roll. Under normal operating conditions, the hitch would never be
subjected to angles greater than these.
The socket is mounted permanently on the towing vehicle, rigidly attached
to the chassis. The shaft will, similarly, be rigidly attached to the cradle chassis
of the LSES. All relative motion between the two will take place at the ball and
socket joint, as in a conventional trailer.
The hitch will be constructed of the same material as the chassis since it
possesses a high strength to weight ratio and has proven to be durable and reliable.
To determilae the thickness of the shaft, a worst case scenario was used where all
of the shelter's weight was supported by it (see appendix D).
DESIGN SUMMARY
The tracking system for tile LSES is a set of six flexible, hemispherical
wheels, supported by an array of curved ribs. Kevlar 49 is the material used to
ensure flexibility. The stainless steel wire lnesh and the fiberglass reinforced cleat
provide tile traction over the loose lunar regolith. A Mylar cover is used to prevent
tile buildup of dust within tile system.
The suspension design is a torsion bar system capable of supporting tile
vehicle and absorbing the dynamic load associated with the uneven terrain. Each
wheel has independent suspension for maximum ground contact and a mylar dust
cover.
The transport system for the LSES is a ball and socket hitch that will allow
the shelter to be attached to another vehicle. This passive system minimizes the
weight and power requirement of the shelter.
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INTRODUCTION
Power system selection is generally a function of mission duration and power
required. Six power systems are in use or under development at the present time.
They are the radioisotope thermoelectric generator, the photovoltaic solar array, the
solar dynamic system, the nuclear reactor system, the battery and the fuel cell.
The purpose of this section of the report is to select the power supply for the
emergency lunar shelter based on system mass, volume, availability of fuel and
deployed area. Its specific features will be outlined at the conclusion of this section.
POWER SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
The emergency lunar shelter power system should operate for a maximum of
five day/night periods and supply continuous energy at a rate of 10.7kW. Only
critical systems, such as life support, were considered. Power need and allocation
were extrapolated fi'om preliminary power requirements for NASA's lunar base and
space station. [1,11,12].
Because the lunar shelter is portable, the power system must operate safely
and at a close proximity.
The system's weight and volume should be minimized to provide portability
and decrease earth to moon transportation costs.
Deployable area of subsystems external to the shelter must be minimized to
prevent damage caused by solar flares, lunar dust, and meteorites.
STATUS OF POWER SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Requirement
Supplies 10.7 kW nighttime power
Provides continuous power (5 days)
Operates safely
Is in close proximity to shelter
Status
Met: The present
day primary fuel
cell with
cryostorage is
capable of power
levels less than
25kWe.
Met: The present
day PFC is
recommended for
short duration
missions(less than
10 days).
Met: The PFC
requires no
radiation shielding
but does require
safety precautions
that prevent
hydrogen
explosion.
Met: The PFC
doesn't produce
radiation and
operates at a
temperature of
355K. It may be
insulated to
operate within the
shelter.
Minimizes volume
Minimizes mass
Minimizes deployable area
Met: For the given
duration, the PFC
posses the lowest
volume of all
systems compared
(2 cubic meters)
Met: The PFC
possesses the
lowest mass of all
systems compared.
(1112kg)
Met: The PFC
requires the
smallest deployed
area of all systems
compared.
(18 square meters)
PREDICTED POWER SYSTEM ALLOCATIONS
The allocation of power given in the table below is an extrapolation of power
requirements of NASA's lunar base and space station [1,11,12]. They are
,therefore, only a prediction of the lunar shelter's power needs. Final power.
assessment is dependent on the final design of the shelter.
Table 1 Power System Allocations
System Power Requirement
Communications
Life Support
• Air production and Revitalization
• Air handling
• Heating/Cooling/Humidity control
• Food Storage/Preparation
• Housekeeping
• Water production and maintenance
• Waste Control
0.5 kWe
8.0kWe
Lighting 0.3kWe
Radiation Protection 0.5kWe
Airlock 0.8kWe
Work Stations 0.2kWe
Electrical Power Distribution
• Conversion and Control
• Power Storage
1.0kWe
Total 10.7kWe
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF POWER SYSTEM
ALTERNATIVES
Solar Power
Solar Dynamic
A solar dynamic (SD) system uses a solar concentrator to concentrate solar
energy into a high temperature receiver. This energy is used to heat the working
fluid of a dynamic energy conversion (DEC) cycle (Brayton, Rankine or Stirling
cycle). For lunar night operation, a thermal energy storage (TES) material provides
heat to the DEC.
SD systems are still in the development phase
promise power levels between 3 and 300 kWe. [13]
Advantages
for space operation but
Future SD systems offer potential for efficient, lightweight, relatively compact
power.
Thermal storage provides a more energy dense medium than electrochemical
batteries. Also, SD systems generally weigh less than power systems using
photovoltaic (PV) arrays. In addition, TES requires less deployed array area.
Disadvantages
During the lunar night, power is only provided by TES. Therefore, if the
emergency shelter was needed for the last five days of the fourteen day lunar night,
fourteen days of thermal storage would be required.
The thermal energy fluid and power subsystems cool during a lunar night. An
additional power source may be required to produce temperatures for normal DEC
operation.
The production of heat is dependent on sun angle. At times, power consuming
sun tracking devices may be needed.
Solar Photovoltaic
Solar photovoltaic arrays (PV arrays) are static conversion devices which
directly convert solar radiant energy to electrical energy. Present state of the art PV
systems use a nickel hydrogen batteries for night storage. Regenerative fuel cells
are being considered as storage devices for future PV arrays.
PV power systems have been used extensively for satellites requiring power
levels of 2kWe and below [14]. PV arrays using regenerative fuel cell storage are
being considered for a future manned lunar outpost requiring 100kWe.
Advantages
During a lunar day, PV systems directly convert radiant energy into solar energy.
Power conversion units and storage devices are not needed during daylight
operation.
I
PV systems are a low risk technology because they are presently operational.
Solar energy is an abundant available energy source.
This system requires little or no moving parts.
Disadvantages
The present state of the art nickel-hydrogen battery possesses a low energy
density (14W-h/kg). Massive systems would result from high power requirements
or missions of long duration.
Regenerative fuel cells produce their own fuel supply (H 2 and 02) through
the electrolysis of water. Electricity from a PV solar array is needed to produce
electrolysis[ 15]. During the fourteen day lunar night, this is not possible.
PV efficiency is dependent on sun angle.
PV systems require a larger array area than SD systems.
Nuclear Power
Radioisotope
Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTG's) produce heat through the
radioactive decay of an isotope (usually Pu-238). The heat produced on the hot side
of a thermoelectric device provides a temperature difference for a thermoelectric
device. The temperature potential is converted directly into electricity by the
thermoelectric device.
Previous RTG's have produced power no larger than 500We. Radioisotopes
may be used to produce heat for dynamic energy conversion cycles to produce
power ranging from 1 to 10kWe [16]. These systems are called Dynamic Isotope
Power systems. (DIPS)
Advantages
RTG's have been used for planetary exploration missions and have operated
for up to 12 years in space. They are an existing long-life space power source.
RTG and DIP systems are compact and require less radioactive shielding
than nuclear reactors.
They don't require sunlight. RTGs and DIPs are autonomous systems whose
operation is independent of sun orientation and position.
RTG systems have a small amount of moving parts.
Disadvantages
RTGs are only used for low power operations.
RTGs and DIPs are potentially dangerous systems which require shielding
from radioactivity.
They are dependent on rare and costly radioactive isotopes. Plutonium 238,
for example, costs approximately $20 million per kWe [17].
Nuclear Reactor
Nuclear reactors provide heat through the controlled fission of heavy nuclei
(such as uranium-235). This heat is converted to electrical energy through the
application of a dynamic energy conversion cycle.
Nuclear reactors remain in the development stage. They are predicted to
supply from 10kWe to 100MWe of power for space applications [17].
Advantages
The nuclear reactor seems to be the only realistic power option in the
megawatt regime.
Nuclear reactors are autonomous and independent of sun position and
orientation.
With minimal shielding, nuclear reactors possess less mass/kWe than solar
and chemical power sources. Therefore, by shielding them with regolith,
transportation costs are less.
They have long operating lifetimes. The SP-100 nuclear reactor designed for
a future lunar base is predicted to operate for seven years [18].
Disadvantages
Radioactive systems are potentially hazardous.
A delay is needed before power is supplied.
The portability of the system requires that the nuclear reactor be placed in
close proximity to crew members. The mass required for shielding crew members
located 10m from the reactor exceeds 15000kg [18].
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Electrochemical Power
Batteries
A battery is an electrochemical cell arrangement of two electrodes and an
electrolyte which produces current as a result of the chemical reaction within the
cell.
Battery powered systems are generally reserved for short duration missions
(less than one week) for a maximum power supply of 7kWe [ 19].
Advantages
Battery power is independent of sun position and orientation.
Batteries are compact and safe energy sources
Disadvantages
Batteries are limited to low power, short duration missions.
Batteries posses a low specific energy. The state of the art nickel-hydrogen
battery has a specific energy of 14W-h/kg [19].
Fuel Cells
A primary fuel cell is a form of storage battery in which the chemical energy
is stored in a reactant tank outside the cell. The reactants are fed to, or removed
from the electrodes when required. A typical space power fuel cell is the
hydrogen/oxygen fuel cell in which hydrogen reacts with oxygen to produce water.
The release of electrons due to the reaction produces power.
A regenerative fuel cell differs from a primary fuel cell because of its use of
an electrolysis unit (EU). The EU converts the product of a fuel cell (i.e. H20 ) into
required fuel (i.e. H2) and an oxidizer (02). In this manner, regenerative fuel cells
last longer.
Since the successful testing of the space shuttle orbiter fuel cell unit (UTC
PC-17C) [20] primary fuel cells are capable of powers beyond 25kWe.
Regenerative fuel cells, which are still in development, are theoretically capable of
providing power in the 100kWe range.
Advantages
Primary fuel cells are existing technology and have made significant
advances. The Apollo fuel cell provided 115 kW-h of energy at a rate of 2kWe in
1968 [20]. The Space Shuttle Orbiter's fuel cell, in 1979, produced 2600 of energy
at a rate of 26kW.
The efficiency of fuel cells increase for low power levels
Fuel cells are not dependent on sun orientation or position.
Fuel cells posses little or no moving parts.
Disadvantages
Fuel cell systems are primarily used for short duration missions (less than 10
days).
Certain safety precaution must be followed to prevent the explosion of
hydrogen.
A delay is needed before power is provided.
The following table gives a summary of the levels of power provided by each
power system. Because of the massive shielding requirement of the nuclear reactor
and the insubstantial power provided by the battery and RTG systems, they will not
be considered as a power supply.
Power Level Summary
Power System
Solar Dynamic
Solar Photovoltaic
RTG
Dynamic Isotope
Nuclear Reactor
Batteries
Primary Fuel Cells
Regenerative Fuel Cells
Power Ranqe
3 to 300 kWe
<2kWe to >100kWe
< 500kWe
1 to 10 kWe
10kWe to 100MWe
<7kWe
< 25kWe
< 100kWe
GUIDELINES FOR SELECTION
Power system selection was determined by studies done by NASA on multi-
kWe power source alternatives [21], and on recommendations provided by Los
Alamos National Laboratory(see Figure 2 below).
Portability was the main consideration when comparing power alternatives.
A power system was chosen which minimized mass, stowed volume and deployed
area.
A
v
-.d
>
_t2
..A
©
Q.
r
_9
t--
C.)
..d
t._
iO 5
v,_;_'..__/]i:, NUCLEAR REACTORS /'_-'>:;;':.p;;,_:tIO_ v_d//__, .. , ; _ ¢;,"_
- ,.;!;>;.:.:,!_////," i Y._ "" 7"_./,4"×_:
,o_
I DAY I MONTH I YEAR IO YEARS
DURATION OF USE
iO2
10°
io-'J
IHOUR
Figure 2. Regimes of possible space power applicability.
POWER SYSTEM COMPARISON
The values of mass, volume and deployed area are compared below for a
nighttime power of 10.7kWe. The estimates given are based on a study done by
NASA on multi-kWe power source alternatives [21 ].
Mass Comparison
Figure 3 illustrates the differences in mass for the various power systems.
Lithium Fluoride is a storage medium for solar dynamic power systems. Based on a
specific thermal energy of 302 W-hr/kg [22], the mass of this medium alone
eliminates the SD system from further consideration.
Nighttime Mass Requirement
M
a
S
S
4500_
4oooii
300011
25oo_1
200011 4252 3672
150011 2943
loooil oo
,° lJ
LiF PVwith RFC DIPS
Thermal RUE
Storage
Figure 3. Mass of power systems
Of the four systems compared above, the least massive are the DIP and RFC.
Figure 4 compares the mass of the DIP to the PV/RFC system and various fuel cell
systems.
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Volume Comparison
Figure 5 shows a comparison of the stowed volume of each power system.
These estimates are based on the combined volume of major system components.
Nighttime Volume Requirements
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Figure 5 Stowed volume of specific power systems
Comparison of Deployed Area
Figure 6 illustrates the differences in deployed area of !hese systems. The
deployed area is the area of components external to the shelter. For the fuel cells
and the DIPS system, the deployed area is the area of the radiator needed. For the
PV/RFC system, this area also includes the area of the array.
Deployed Area Requirements
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Figure 6 Deployed area of specific power systems
POWER SYSTEM SELECTION
Of the power systems compared, the primary fuel cell with crystorage
required the least mass, volume and deployed area for the 5 day/night duration at an
energy rate of 10.7kWe. Specific attributes of the system are given below [22].
Power System Specifics
Hydrogen-oxygen alkaline fuel cell:
Current density, mA/cm 2
Cell active area, m 2
Operating pressure, MPa
Operating temperature, K
Conversion efficiency, percent
215-1075
0.092
0.4
355
70
Electrical power management and distribution (PMAD)
Specific mass, kg/kWe
Specific volume m3/kg
Efficiency, percent
10
0.00025
90
Radiator
Effective emmissivity
Specific mass kg/m 2
Rejection, temperature, K
Sink temperature, K:
Day
Night
0.595
5
355
220
20
Fuel cell reactant storage
Cryostorage, psi
Specific volume, m3 per 1000kg reactants
Tankage mass, kg per m2 enclosure
Totals
Mass, kg
Volume, m3
Radiator area, m 2
15
2.6
42
1112
5
18
START-UP AND SHUTDOWN PROCEDURES
Because the PFC system will be used as needed, the astronauts using the
system should know the necessary procedures in starting and stopping the system to
prevent hydrogen explosion. This section will give a brief explanation of these
procedures.
Unfortunately, starting a fuel cell is never a matter of opening the reactant
feed valves and turning on a switch. Depending on the characteristics of the system,
certain routines must be followed to ensure all cells are functioning according to
design and that no mishaps, such as hydrogen explosions, take place.
A start-up procedure claimed to minimize explosions in hydrogen-oxygen fuel
cells consists of the following steps [23]:
1) Hydrogen is supplied to the hydrogen compartments for 1 to 10 minutes.
2) After this period of time, an inert gas is blown into the hydrogen
compartments.
3) Oxygen is then supplied to the oxygen gas compartments.
4) When the correct open circuit voltage is attained, more hydrogen is fed
into the hydrogen chambers.
5) Stack operation is then begun.
Before system shutdown, the reliability and stability of low temperature
hydrogen-oxygen fuel cell batteries may improve if the current load is lowered to
about 30,A/cm 2.
Astronauts should possess knowledge of the particular start-up and shutdown
procedures necessary to begin power production and to prevent disaster.
SUMMARY
Power system selection is generally a function of mission duration and power
required. The following systems were compared to provide power for the lunar
emergency shelter:
1) Solar Dynamic
2) Solar Photovoltaic
3) Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator
4) Nuclear Reactor
5) Dynamic Isotope Power Source
6) Regenerative Fuel Cell
7) Nickel-hydrogen battery
8) Primary fuel cell
The power system selected was required to operate continuously and safely at
a rate of 10.7kWe and for a maximum of five day/night periods. Because the shelter
is portable, a system was selected which could operate in close proximity to the
shelter and minimize volume, weight and deployable area.
Although it required safety precautions during its start-up and shutdown
processes, the primary fuel cell with cryostorage was chosen because of its
portability. The PFC required the least volume, mass and deployed area than any
other system considered.
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ASSUMPTIONS
This section outlines the investigation and design of tile Communications
system for the LSES. Several alternative systems were studied utilizing the
assumptions below and the guidelines presented later in this section.
It is assumed that a lunar base exists which includes the equipment necessary
to provide bi-directional communication between the Earth and Moon. This
equipment is fiflly operational, serviceable, and independent of LSES operations.
A maximum required range is set at 1000 km for the system. This allows
full communication capabilities for the LSES at any point within the range of lunar
vehicles.
Initial audio and telemetry data rate is set at 250 Kbps (Kilo Bits per
Second). This rate is supported by all communication links comprising the
system. [24]
Satellites and/or space stations exist for relay of communication signals.
Linking with these platforms is readily available and fully adaptable.
ASSUMPTIONS
Lunar base with communication link between Earth and Moon.
Maximum range of 1000 kin. (621 miles).
Audio and telemetry data rate set at 250 Kbps.
Existing satellite and/or space station for communication signal relay.
LUNAR COMMUNICATIONS
Tile facing diagram depicts the various communication links required for the
LSES. Space station, satellite, and lunar base positions are assumed for providing
Earth communications. All system requirements and options are further discussed
later in this section.
,Earth,.oun 
©
TDRSS
I
Lander
\
\
\
\
Rover
Lunar Communications
SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Established links to allow communication between the LSES and each of the
following: Lunar base, EVA suits, Lunar vehicles, and Earth. Earth
communication is via the lunar base.
Allow communication at any point within the maximum range of the lunar
rover. This distance is set at 1000 km (621 miles).
Required to operate within the geophysical and environmental conditions that
exist on the hmar surface. This includes terrain fluctuations (i.e. crater walls) as
well as a relatively sharp lunar surface curvature. Environmental condition hazards
are thermal variance, radiation, nearly non-existent atmosphere, and solar storm
magnetic interference.
System power requirement must be low in order to satisfy' the overall design
of the LSES. Power level is set at less than 2.0 kW. However, the system must
be able to handle the required data rate of 250 Kbps.
System reliability and probability of success must be high to ensure that
communications are available and accurate at all times. At the same time,
hardware parameters of volume, weight, and cost are requisitely minimized.
Human interaction with the system must be simple to allow ease of operation
and maintenance. Redundant sub-systems will minimize maintenance requirements
and location of equipment within the LSES for easier access.
COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS
Allow communication between LSES and:
- Lunar base Lunar vehicles
- EVA suits - Earth (via lunar base)
Must allow communication over the entire range of lunar vehicles, set at 1000 Km.
Overcome geophysical barriers such as crater walls and lunar surface curvature.
Resist environmental conditions (radiation, thermal).
Overcome solar storm magnetic interference.
High reliability and probability of success.
Minimal volume, weight, and cost.
Low power requirement (less than 2 kW).
Handle required data rate and human interaction.
DESIGN GUIDELINES
Tile main design considerations are high reliability and probability of
success. This ensures that communications will be available and accurate at all
possible locations and in any conditions. Proper design and redundant sub-systems
will allow this to be met.
Existing technology will be utilized whenever possible to minimize the need
for technological innovation and the related expense. Adapting and upgrading
existing equipment will meet design requirements while also satisfying cost
requirements.
A ,nodular design will be utilized whenever possible to allow for easier
component replacement. This enhances the human interaction aspect by making
maintenance easier and more accessible.
Optional equipment will not be included because this is an emergency shelter
and space is extremely limited. This will minimize cost, complexity, and contribute
to reliability. Additionally, this will minimize the cost of transporting the shelter
to the Moon.
Emphasis is put on the system design being able to accept technical changes
in the future. This takes into account the possibility of design requirelnent changes
and technology upgrades.
DESIGN GUIDELINES - SUMMARY
l tigh reliability and probability of success.
Use of existing technology whenever possible.
Use of a modular design for low cost and ease of maintenance.
Emergency shelter design without use of any optional equipment.
Allow for possible design requirement changes and teclmology upgrades.
COMMUNICATIONS DESIGN
The facing figure is a block diagram of the communications system tbr tile
LSES. The combined communication and data management equipment are
distributed processing networks for long-term use on the lunar surface. The main
components are the Overall Data Processor (ODP), Multipurpose Control Console
(MCC), Multiplexer, Transceiver, and Antenna Assemblies. The ODP provides
storage and power for data management and communication control fimctions. The
MCC provides the shelter crew with a centralized workstation for command and
control of all communications. The multiplexer allows use of multiple receivers
and transmitters with multiple antenna assemblies.[25]
The system is dual redundant in several areas to ensure continued operation
in the event of a single failure. Redundant subsystems include power supply,
multiplexer, antemm assemblies, and transceiver. With the exception of the power
supply, all redundant equipment is maintained in a "cold" ready condition. That
is, the equipment is connected to the system but not supplied with power. This
reduces the load on the shelter power supply. The communication system backup
power supply is connected and powered up to ensure continuity of power at all
times.J25]
Antenna assemblies consist of antennas, control equipment, and all required
wiring and waveguides. Two omni-directional dipole antennas are used, as well
as two paraboloidal aperture antennas.
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Communications System block diagram
SHELTER COMMUNICATIONS WITH EARTH
There are several options for communicating between the LSES and Earth.
The prilnary options are listed in the facing chart and discussed below. Ill selecting
an option, consideration must be given to the cost of implementing the system
within the shelter. In addition, the restraints of power, weight, volume, and
complexity are considered.
The direct communication system involves communication with Earth ground
stations without the use of intermediate relays or stations. The system would
require high power output and complex control equipment. The benefit would be
the lack of dependency on outside systems, such as satellites or space stations.
Communication via satellite involves the relaying of signals from the shelter
to an intermediate satellite and then to an Earth ground station. This reduces the
complexity and amount of ground equiplnent required, but still requires a large
power output.
Communication via the lunar base utilizes the existing Earth communication
equipment aboard the lunar base. Communication signals from the LSES are
relayed through the lunar base equipment and then to an Earth ground station. This
dramatically reduces the power output requirement, control equipment complexity,
and antenna size. The signal from the shelter is relayed to the lunar base via an
existing satellite.
Communication via the lunar base is selected due to the significantly lower
cost. The lower cost is attributable to lower power output requirement, less control
equipment, smaller antennas, and less overall complexity of the system. Another
primary reason for this selection is the relative use of this part of the
communication system. The shelter is emergency in nature and will be in use for
a relatively short time. Therefore, a self contained and complex system is not
warranted.
SHELTER COMMUNICATIONS WITH EARTH
SUMMARY OF OPTIONS
Direct communication with Earth
Communication with Earth via satellite
Communication with Earth via lunar base
SHELTER COMMUNICATIONS WITH EVA SUITS
AND LUNAR VEHICLES
There are several options for communicating between the LSES and either
EVA suits or lunar vehicles. The primary options are listed in the facing chart and
discussed below. In selecting an option, consideration must be given to the cost
of implementing the system within the shelter. In addition, the restraints of power,
weight, volume, and complexity are considered.
Owing to the emergency nature of the lunar shelter, communications with
personnel on the lunar surface will be minimal. Also, these communications will
be short range.
Communication via satellite involves relaying signals through an in-place
satellite to personnel on the lunar surface. Additional equipment will not be
required because this system is utilized for other communications.
Lunar surface relay stations makeup a large array of fixed receiving and
transmitting UHF stations covering the lunar surface. A single system aboard the
shelter would then be capable of communication with all outlying areas. The cost
and complexity of this system are both high, as a large number of stations is
required for ample coverage.
An independent short range UHF system involves a fixed receiving and
translnitting station aboard the shelter and portable sets for use by personnel when
outside the shelter. A UHF system ensures accurate and reliable colnlnunications
even under the effects of high levels of solar radiation.
The independent short range system is selected for its relatively low cost,
effectiveness, and self containment. Reliance on outside equipment and power
sources is eliminated at no reduction in service. As a backup, the existing satellite
system utilized for Earth communications may also be used for lunar surface
communications.
SHELTER COMMUNICATIONS WITH EVA SUITS
AND LUNAR VEHICLES
SUMMARY OF OPTIONS
Communication via satellite
Communication via lunar surface relay stations
Independent short range UHF system
SHELTER COMMUNICATIONS WITH LUNAR BASE
There are several options for communicating between the LSES and tlm lunar
base. The primary options are listed in the facing chart and discussed below. I11
selecting an option, consideration must be given to the cost of implementing the
system within the shelter. In addition, the restraints of power, weight, volume, and
complexity are considered.
Communication with the lunar base is highly probable during the short
duration stay within the shelter. This part of the communication system must be
highly reliable and include a backup means.
A direct link system involves 'hard wiring' between the shelter and lunar base
or a single antenna large enough to allow communication at any distance (up to
1000 kin) from the lunar base. The hard wiring is necessarily impractical due to
the mobile nature of the shelter while the single antenna would need to be very tall
to allow for the curvature of the Moon.
Communication via satellite involves relaying signals through an in-place
satellite to the hmar base. Additional equipment will not be required because this
system is utilized for other communications.
Lunar surface relay stations makeup a large array of fixed receiving and
transmitting UHF stations covering the lunar surface. A single system aboard the
shelter would then be capable of communication with the lunar base from any
location on the hmar surface (within 1000 kin). The cost and complexity of this
system are both high, as a large number of stations is required for ample coverage.
Communication via satellite is selected primarily due to the lower cost and
not requiring additional equipment aboard the shelter. The direct and relay station
alternatives are effective, but both are cost prohibitive or too massive for the
limited space availability aboard the LSES.
SHELTER COMMUNICATIONS WITH LUNAR BASE
SUMMARY OF OPTIONS
Direct link
Via satellite
Relay stations
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS
Life support systems include all of the necessary systems to provide and
maintain a habitable environment within the LSES. This includes ally required
equipment as well as integration of this equipment into the shelter. The following
systems are discussed in detail
Environlnental Control system
Thermal Control system
Fire Detection and Suppression system
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL FOR LIFE
SUPPORT SYSTEMS (ECLSS)
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INTRODUCTION
The tbllowmg section discusses various alternatives for controlling the
environment in the Lunar Surface Emergency Shelter. A major part of the ECLSS
is the production of oxygen and nitrogen. The life support system will be required
to deliver a total of 2,138,400 liters of all oxygen/nitrogen mixture. This total is
based on the assumption that each person takes an average of 25 breaths/min, and
consumes 3 liter/breath of regular air that is composed of 21% oxygen, 78%
nitrogen, and 1% of trace elements. For the purpose of the life support system, the
1% of trace elements need not be reproduced because they are not vital for life
support. Each alternative for oxygen/nitrogen production will be analyzed with
respect to the following parameters:
mass
volume
power
reliability
efficiency
production of undesirable byproducts
safety
Since safety is such an important requirement, and man made equipment is
never 100% fail-proof, a back-up safety system will be incorporated into the final
design.
Other functions of the ECLSS involve:
monitoring and maintaining the quality of cabin atmosphere
utilization/removal of carbon dioxide
humidity control
Systems for these functions will be proposed and analyzed according to their
efficiency and reliability. The systems that perform these functions will be able to
successfi_lly meet the requirements for mass, volume, and power, and none have
been known to produce undesirable byproducts.
REQUIREMENTS FOR ECLSS
Requirelnent
Produce oxygen/nitrogen
Mass
Vohune
Power
Reliability
Status
Met: by use of cryogenic storage
Met: by keeping system as simple
as possible
Met: by keeping system as simple
as possible
Met: by keeping system as simple
as possible
High: based upon previous research
Efficiency High: based upon previous research
Undesirable byproducts
Safety
Negligible: based upon previous
research
Met: by incorporation of back-up
system
Maintenance of cabin atmosphere Met:by incorporating air
monitors/filters
CO2 removal Met:by incorporating separate
subsystem
Humidity control Met:by incorporating separate
subsystem
DESIGN GUIDELINES
Mass, volume,and power requirements will all be minimized by use of a
simple system. However, the simpler system is not guaranteed to be the most
efficient, therefore, efficiency will be determined from research previously
performed on the various systems. Reliability and production of undesirable
byproducts, such as various gases, will also be analyzed from the research and
testing previously performed on each system. Safety of the final design will be met
by incorporating a back-up system. Monitoring and maintaining the quality of the
cabin atmosphere will be achieved by use of air monitors and filters. A separate
system will also be incorporated for carbon dioxide and humidity control. This
system will be created from already existing and researched technology.
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION PRINCIPLES
OXYGEN/NITROGEN PRODUCTION
Automated Subsystem Control for Life Support System (ACLSS)
Use of lunar soil to produce oxygen
-electrolysis
-fluorination
-carbo-chlorination
-magqna oxidation
-vapor pyrolysis
Physicochemical methods
-physical methods
-chemical methods
Electrolysis
-water vapor
-carbon dioxide
Bioregenerative
-plant use
-animal use
Chemical 02 generation
-potassium superoxide
-lithium peroxide
-sodium superoxide
-calcium superoxide
Cryogenic storage
MONITOR/MAINTAIN CABIN ATMOSPHERE QUALITY
Particle cotmter monitor (PCM)
Major constituent analyzer (MCA)
Trace contaminant monitor (TCM)
Air filters
CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL
Lithium hydroxide scrubbers
Four bed molecular sieve
Electrochelnical depolarized cell
Air polarized concentrator
HUMIDITY CONTROL
Condensing heat exchangers
Desiccant
4BMS
DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION PRINCIPLES
OXYGEN/NITROGEN PRODUCTION
Various alternative solutions will be discussed for tile fimction of
oxygen/nitrogen production. These alternatives will be analyzed as to the various
requirements previously introduced.
Automated Subsystem Control for Life Support Systems (ACLSS):
This system requires the use of highly advanced computer networks to
generate all the systems necessary for the function of life support. This has been
researched by NASA npon the demand of a permanently manned Space Station.
Due to the complexity of such a system, the requirements for mass, volume, and
power are not feasible for the use in an emergency shelter, despite its ability to be
reliable, efficient, and not to produce any undesirable byproducts.
Use of hmar regolith to produce oxygen:
This system is based on the knowledge that lunar regolith contains significant
amounts of oxygen. Various methods for the removal of oxygen from regolith are:
-electrolysis
-fluorination
-carbo-chlorination
-magma oxidation
-vapor pyrolysis
This alternative has been only moderately researched for a permanently
manned Space Station and, therefore, would require quite complex equipment for
use in a temporary emergency shelter. This system would only produce oxygen,
therefore, an alternative system would be required for the production of nitrogen.
The equipment required for use of this alternative would exceed the mass, volume,
and power requirements for a feasible emergency shelter. The reliability,
efficiency, and tendency to produce undesirable byproducts is not yet certain since
intensive research and experimentation on this system has not yet been completed.
Physicochemical methods:
This system uses physical or chemical methods to perform life support tasks.
Physicochemical systems are well understood, despite the fact that they have never
been utilized on Earth or in space. Therefore, this system would not be very
reliable and not guaranteed to be efficient. This system would be able to perform
acceptably with respect to mass, volume, and power requirements. Several
components of physicochemicai systems have been proven to create hazardous
byproducts.
Electrolysis:
Electrolysis systems can be used to produce oxygen from either water vapor
or carbon dioxide. Water vapor electrolysis (WVE) can be used to generate a
quantity of oxygen for metabolic consumption and provide partial humidity control
by removing water vapor from the atmosphere. Oxygen and H 2 are generated from
the water vapor in an air stream flowing tln'ough an electrochemical module
consisting of a series of individual water vapor electrolysis electrochemical cells.
Carbon dioxide electrolysis is performed in much the same manner as WVE and
produces potable water for crew consumption. These systems would require an
alternative system for nitrogen production. The extra hardware required would
exceed the mass, volume, and power requirements for the life support system.
Electrolysis is reliable, efficient, and produces no known hazardous byproducts.
Bioregenerative systems:
Bioregenerative life support systems utilize plant growth for food, water, and
atmospheric revitalization. The biggest stumbling block in the initial phases of
developing a bioregenerative life support system is encountered in collecting and
consolidating the data. Therefore, these systems have been poorly understood in
the engineering community. Additionally, organisms do not have constant,
predictable performance characteristics; rather, they operate within a range of
performance characteristics that may differ between individuals, as well as between
organisms. This fact contributes to this systems unreliability and inefficiency.
Bioregenerative systems also utilize a great deal of volume and mass for successful
plant growth. This system would not require a great deal of power to be
successful. Bio-regenerative systems cannot produce nitrogen and do produce an
undesirable byproduct, carbon dioxide.
Chen3ical 0,_ generation:
This system involves tile production of oxygen from reactions that take place
between various compounds and carbon dioxide. A few of the compounds that
have been tested include potassium superoxide, lithium peroxide, sodimn
superoxide, and calcium superoxide. Problems with efficiency occur durmg
experiments with most of these compounds. Most of the problems that have
occurred involve over or under production of oxygen relative to the amount of CO2
utilized. This system also does not produce the nitrogen necessary for life support
in the emergency shelter. This system would operate under acceptable mass,
volume, and power requirements.
Cryogenic storage:
Oxygen and nitrogen can be terlned cryogens and Call be stored as a
cryogenic fluid in pressurized tanks. A cryogen is transferred from its tank to the
atmosphere by injecting a gaseous pressurant into the ullage of a cryogenic supply
tank. This raises its pressure from some base level to a desired transfer level.
Cryogenic storage is presently m use for space applications and is, therefore,
considered to be efficient and reliable. This system would operate under the
necessary mass, volume, and power specifications, and does not produce any
undesirable byproducts.
MONITOR/MAINTAIN CABIN ATMOSPHERE QUALITY
Various solution alternatives will be discussed for the fimction of monitoring
and maintaining the cabin atmosphere, monitoring for 02 and CO2 as well as for
other major constituents and trace contaminants in the cabin atmosphere. If
particulates are detected, the system should be able to readily remove them from
the atmosphere. In order to satisfy the requirements for this function, all of the
alternative solution principles introduced will be utilized in this system. A particle
counter monitor (PCM) will be implemented to detect particles from .5 to 100
micrometers. A major constituent analyzer (MCA) will be implemented to detect
such substances as N2, 02, H2O, H2, CH2, and CO2. A trace contaminant monitor
(TCM) will be implemented to detect various undesirable byproducts that may be
produced. Common, durable, and available air filters will be included in the cabin
equipment to remove particulates that may build up in the cabin atmosphere.
CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL/UTILIZATION
Various alternatives will be discussed to perform tile function of either
utilizing or removing carbon dioxide that is detected in the cabin atmosphere by
the MCA. Of the solution alternatives presented, the lithium hydroxide
scrubbers and the 4BMS are the most efficient and reliable for CO2 removal.
The 4BMS could also be implemented for humidity control as well as for CO2
control. Therefore, it would be more efficient to use the 4BMS for the function
of carbon dioxide removal.
HUMIDITY CONTROL
Of tile alternative solution principles introduced to perform the fimction of
humidity control, the 4BMS, which utilizes a two-media desiccant bed for water
removal, would be the most efficient alternative because of its adaptability for
carbon dioxide removal.
DESIGN SUMMARY FOR ECLSS
Tile final design of the ECLSS utilizes cryogenic storage to perform the
function of oxygen/nitrogen production. The oxygen and nitrogen are stored in
separate cryogenic storage tanks as cryogens. The cryogens are released into the
cabin through the use of a gaseous pressurant. This pressurant, stored in separate
pressure vessels, is injected into the ullage, empty space in the cryogenic storage
tanks, thereby raising the pressure of the cryogenic storage tank from some base
level to the desired transfer level (ramp process). Once the desired transfer
pressure is obtained, liquid cryogen is discharged from the tank via a connecting
line to a receiver tank (expulsion process). A brief hold period between the ramp
and expulsion periods is often utilized to allow stabilization of tank pressure and
temperatures before expulsion is initiated. The amount of each cryogen that is
released to the cabin atmosphere is determined by the amount of pressurant that is
injected into its storage tank.
Particulates in the cabin atmosphere will be monitored using a PCM. This
device uses an A1GaAs laser diode to produce a light beam at 780-nm wavelength
which is scattered by particles in the air sample and detected by a photodetector.
The light beam passes through several lenses and an aperture to produce a thin
plane in the particle sensing zone. As each particle passes through the sensing
zone and scatters light, the photodetector converts the scattered light energy into
electrical pulses which have an amplitude corresponding to the particle size.
Particles that are monitored are between .5 and 100 micrometers.
Oxygen, nitrogen, carbon dioxide, water vapor, methane, and hydrogen are
all detected by a MCA. The MCA is a mass spectrometer which utilizes a single
focusing magnetic sector with a Faraday cup detector. It has a capability of
monitoring in the mass to charge range of 1 to 48. The instruments response time
is less than 100 ms for all gases except water which has a response time of 500 to
800 ms. Vacuum is maintained to the instrument by an ion pump which operates
by surface absorption and chemical reaction of gases with the active metals of
titanium and tantalum. It has a sampling rate of one sample per minute and draws
samples through long, thin tubing from several locations within the cabin.
Trace contaminants are monitored by a TCM. The TCM utilizes a gas
chromatography/mass spectrometry principles to analyze both species and quality
for mass to charge ratio of 24 to 250. The unit is capable of detecting trace
contaminants at a resolution of 50% of the shelters maximum allowable
concentration for each species monitored. The typical cycle time is 1 hour. The
samples are drawn through tubing similar to that used for tile MCA.
Heavy duty air filters will be utilized to filter the air for particulates and
trace contaminants. Carbon dioxide removal will be accomplished by a 4BMS,
as shown in the accompanying schematic. This uses a zeolite material which has
been fiirther modified by the supplier to produce a material which is extremely
efficient in absorbing carbon dioxide. This material also has a high affinity for
water vapor, therefore, the influent air must be dried, aiding the function by using
a two-media desiccant bed. This bed is made of silica gel and a second zeolite
material (Linde 13X) with a high water removal efficiency. The influent air,
carbon dioxide, and water vapor mixture is first passed through the desiccant bed
where the dew point is reduced to a range of-30 F to -90 F. The carbon dioxide
is then absorbed in the second 5A zeolite bed until the absorbent material becomes
saturated. The carbon dioxide molecular sieve material is then desorbed by a
combination pressure and temperature swing process which requires first evacuating
the bed, then heating it to 400 F. The desorbed carbon dioxide is then purged from
the bed in a concentrated form. During this cycle, the remaining beds are
absorbing so that a continuous carbon dioxide removal capability exists at all times
utilizing this four-bed concept.
A back-up safety system must be incorporated into this desi_,n_ in case of
equipment malfimction. This back-up safety system will utilize easily accessible
safety masks that are attached directly to the cryogenic storage system. These
masks will operate much in the same manner as S.C.U.B.A. regulators in case of
malfimction of the cryogenic expulsion apparatus.
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4BMS CO s removal subassembly schematic
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INTRODUCTION
It is necessary to provide a safe and comfortable temperature tbr the
astronauts during their emergency stay in the shelter. This temperature will be
maintained between 65 F and 75 F. The heat accumulation inside of the lunar
shelter comes from multiple sources. These sources include: harmless radiation
from the sun through the protective shielding, heat produced by the life support
equiplnent, heat produces by the power system, and the heat produced by the
astronauts themselves.
A summation of these heat sources renders a resultant heat acculnulation.
This amount of heat must be kept down to the specified comfortable temperature
range. The alternatives for this thermal control system were examined on the
following criteria:
Reliability
Ease of Implementation
Efficiency
Mass
Safety
Power
The thermal control system will be electronically monitored and controlled.
However, in case of electrical malfunction, it will be easily convertible to manual
operation.
DESIGN GUIDELINES
The design of the thermal control system should be simplistic in nature
because of its limited emergency usage. Ease of implementation is crucial to tile
success of tile thermal control system for the emergency hmar shelter. However,
a simple system does not infer the most desirable efficiency. Tile efficiency will
be tested, based on previous research of existmg hardware, during the synthesis
phase of tile manufacturing process.
Mass and power considerations fluctuate depending on the final thermal
control system chosen. Reliability of the system is a result of the mechanical
quality of the device used. In the case of a mechanical malfunction, a back-up
thermal control system will be incorporated in the design of the overall life support
network.
STATUS OF REQUIREMENTS FOR THERMAL
CONTROL SYSTEM (TCS)
Requirelnent
Reliability.
Status
Met: By research and synthesis testing.
Ease of hnplementation Met: The TLS is installed on Earth.
Efficiency Acceptable: A low maintenance system
which is self contained.
Mass Met: Basic design and light weight
materials.
Safety Met: A back-up, circulatory air turbine
may be implemented.
Power Requirement Acceptable: The system is kept as
simple as possible.
THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM DESIGN
The design utilized for the thermal control system is a tubing system.
Tubing, located on the walls of tile habitable section of the emergency shelter,
extend ill a helical formation down the length of the shelter. Tile working fluid
follows a closed-loop path to a heat exchanger after it has circulated through tile
shelter. Tile heat exchanger cools the passing working fluid while heat is provided
by tile power system. Components of this coolant system are as follows:
Working fluid
Tubing
Pumping System
Heat Exchanger
Radiator
Cryogenic Storage
Modeled after the astronaut's EVA suits, this temperature controlling system
utilizes cooling tubes [30]. The walls of the emergency shelter will be lined with
tubing that houses a working fluid that extracts the excess heat in the shelter.
The variables to consider for this heat transfer system are the working fluid,
the material of the tubes, the diameter of the tubes, the length of the tube, and the
velocity of the working fluid through the tube.
The working fluid implemented is oxygen. Oxygen will be cryogenically
stored in the shelter for the power and oxygen supply systems; therefore, it will not
be inconvenient to store additional oxygen for the thermal control system. As a
cryogenic fluid, oxygen is relatively inexpensive and readily available. However,
it should not be used in systems involving hydrogen or where oil-sealed vacuum
pumps have to be used to lower the vapor pressure [26]. Since neither of these
limiting criteria are involved with the coolant system, oxygen is an ideal choice.
The dimensions of the habitable shelter are 6 feet in diameter and 8.11 feet
in length. The tube will be wound in a helical formation inside of the shelter;
therefore, the number of coils will depend on the working fluid and mass flow rate.
Material of the tubing must have excellent thermal conductive properties and
be capable of achieving the helical formation desired. Aluminum was chosen for
this task. Even though there are better thermal conductive materials, such as
copper, aluminum will best weld to the alummttm protective shell of tile shelter.
This welding may be done otl Earth to minimize labor for installation of the TCS
on the MOON. Also, aluminum is inexpensive, lightweight, and has acceptable
thermal conductive properties. The inner walls of the aluminum tubing will be
anodized such that 11o oxidation may occur between the tubing and liquid oxygen
[291.
With the given length and critical temperatures, the last variables, diameter
and velocity, can be mathematically manipulated. A successfid combination is
obtained, such that the diameter of the tubing will adequately support fluctuating
fluid velocities necessary to maintain the desired heat transfer from the shelter
during the critical temperature phases.
Obviously, the manufacturers choice of the pumping system to be used
should be one that is capable of a fluctuating flow rate and can be electrically and
manually tractable by the astronauts during their emergency stay. A hydraulic
pump is an excellent means of driving the flow through the thermal control system
including the heat exchanger [27]. Also, the pump should be of low maintenance
and capable of sustaining the force, known as the acceleration head, required to
accelerate the fluid in the suction line.
A heat exchanger is necessary to control the temperature of the working fluid
tluough the shelter. A compact heat exchanger, such as a shell and tube or a plate-
fin arrangement, is an good method of extracting or inserting heat from or to the
working fluid [28].
As the working fluid completes a cycle, it is necessary to recompress the
fluid and recirculate it through the process. The heat generated by the compression
process must be removed from the shelter. A good solution for this heat rejection
is a radiator. The difficult hmar environment requires that the radiator be
positioned in such a way so as to avoid direct solar radiation and to be out of view
of the hot surface of the Moon. Oversized radiators, radiator shading devices, or
raising the radiator temperature by using a heat pump, are several solutions which
may be implemented to achieve safe solar radiation shielding [26].
The design of the TCS is protected from many environmental problems
inside the shelter. However, the radiator system will have to take into account its
reduced efficiency due to any possible lunar dust contaminants.
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APPENDIX D: Towing hitch calculations
Calculation of Towing Hitch Shaft Thickness
Approximate mass of Shelter:
Weight on Lunar Surface:
10,000 kg
16350 N
Ultimate Strength of Alloy: 351.59 Mpa
Area = Weight/Ultimate Strength
A = W/Sy
= 46.5 mm 2
Factor of Safety = 4: Area = 186 mm 2
This corresponds to a circular rod of diameter 1.54cm
APPENDIX E: Airiock hatch calculations
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INTEGRATION OF INTERNAL SUBSYSTEMS
Power Source
It was determined that an electrochemical power system utilizing fi_el cells
would require 2 cubic meters of space to provide the necessary power of 10.7 kW.
Thus, a cylindrical section 6 feet in diameter and 2.50 fl long is required to house
the power system (see appendix F). Because the power source is qnite massive,
1100 kg, it must be positioned so that it does not hinder the daily routine of the
astronauts. Therefore, it was decided to place the power system at the anterior
portion of the LSES. The accompanying diagram shows the major areas and
equipment within the LSES. The power supply is positioned directly over the front
suspension system such that the weight is transferred straight to the wheels and
then to the hmar surface. This minimizes the bending moment that would normally
be induced if the power system were cantilevered.
The normal operating temperature of the power source is 355 K. In order
to shield the astronauts from the heat, a two part urethane mixture is used to form
an insulative barrier between a 1/8 inch aluminum divider and the power source's
control panel, as shown in the diagram.
In order to cool the power source, the liquid oxygen used to control the cabin
temperature (see Thermal Control System for Life Support) will be rotated to the
power system exterior.
Floor Deck
Because tim living compartment is made from a cylinder, the floor would
have a steep curvature which would hinder movement about the shelter. Therefore,
it has been proposed to attach channels to the side walls of the internal cylinder to
hold an insertable floor g-rating. Beneath the grating, 38.2 tt 3 of useable space [see
appendix E] will be available to store equipment or perishable items such as food
and water. The floor will consist of several trap doors which will permit access
into this storage area.
An aluminum floor has been selected for use due to its weight -to-strength
ratio of 0.5. The floor will be grated in order to save weight.
Retractable Step_
The design of the shelter resulted in the bottom of the airlock door being
about three feet above the lunar surface. Thus, an astronaut donning a space suit
would have a difficult time climbing into the shelter. To overcome this problem,
a retractable step, similar to those found on recreational vehicles, has been
incorporated into the design. When the vehicle is in transit, the step can be raised
to avoid it from becoming snagged on an impediment.
<J Communications Antenna
Power Source Habitable Area
FRONT Chamber -_ Insulation/Instrument panel Grated Floor Entrance/Exit
• • •
VraiUor Tongue "__ "_J
Available Storage Room
Retractable Step
General shelter layout
CONFIGURATION DESCRIPTION
CONFIGURATION DESCRIPTION
The major elements comprising the shelter are a radiation protection shield,
pressure shell, power generation system and thennal control system. The habitat
will house the crew and provide equipment for crew safety and comfort.
Tile entire mobile lunar shelter will be cylindrical in shape, measuring 12.2fl.
in length and 8.65 ft. in diameter. On a flat surface the suspension will allow a
ground clearance of 4.9ft. The shelter will provide 188fl 3 of habitable space and
38.2ft 3 of storage space below the floor deck.
The radiation shield will consist of aluminum, regolith and a honeycomb
polymer. The honeycomb polymer and regolith also provides some protection from
micro-meteorite bombardment. A total of lin thickness of aluminum will be used
with the regolith and honeycomb structure measuring 14.9in thick. The shield has
been designed to guard against the largest solar flare activity that has been recorded
in the last half century.
The anterior portion of the shelter houses the electrochemical power system
which utilizes filel cells. The power system occupies 70.6ft 3 of cabin space and has
amassoflll2kg. It is capable of supplying 10.7kW of power.
To provide a safe and comfortable ambient temperature for the personnel
inside the shelter, a thermal control system is used. This automatic system
electronically monitors and controls the heating and cooling of the LSES. Heating
of the shelter is accomplished through the heat transfer from onboard equipment.
Cooling is performed by tubular cooling ducts within the shelter walls.
Control of the atmosphere within the LSES is the function of the ECLSS.
Full time monitoring and maintaining of the livable environment is the sole
fimction of this system. This includes production of nitrogen and oxygen, carbon
dioxide removal, humidity control, and air filtering. Cryogenic storage is used for
providing oxygen and nitrogen while high capacity air filters remove particulates
and contaminants. Carbon dioxide is removed by a 4BMS system. A back-up
safety system provides oxygen to personnel in the event of failure of primary
eqnipment. This is provided through safety masks available throughout the shelter.
The onboard communication system consists of all necessary eqtfipment to
allow connnunication with Earth, the hmar base, and personnel on tile lunar surface
ill EVA suits or lunar vehicles. The system utilizes existing satellites to relay
signals to the approprate locations, as well as an independent, short range UHF
system for surt'ace communication.
Mobility of the LSES is accomplished through the use of six hemispherical
wheels in conjunction with a torsion bar suspension. The shelter does not provide
its own mode of movement, but rather is towed by a lunar vehicle using a ball and
socket hitch.
In order to provide a safe and reliable means of accessing the shelter, an
airlock hatch is utilized. The hatch creates an airtight sealing surface as well as
providing required radiation protection. Many afety features are built in to ensure
that pressurization of the shelter is maintained when personnel are aboard.
The habitat is configured to fit well within the 10m diameter internal payload
envelope of the proposed heavy lift launch vehicle (HLLV).
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ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION PRINCIPLES
Alternative solutions considered in the design for the TCS are a circulatory
air turbine and a conglomeration system combining the oxygen supply and thermal
control systems. Major subsystems of each alternative are listed below, with
detailed discussions following
CIRCULATORY AIR TURBINE
Radiator
Pumping System
Monitoring System
OXYGEN SUPPLY/THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
Heat Exchanger
Pumping System
Radiator
CIRCULATORY AIR TURBINE
This design consists of a circulatory air turbine pump which draws tile
existing air ill and passes it tlu-ough a heat exchanger. The magnitude of the
temperature difference will be a function of the fluctuating heat accumulation in the
cabin air with respect to time. The monitoring system will be electronically
controlled as will be the pumping system which it regulates. This system leaves
little room for manual tractability in case of malfunction [27].
This system adds to the power requirements and does not compare favorably
ill the areas of reliability and efficiency [30]. Therefore, this system should be
rejected as a viable coolant system solution. However, it is not to be completely
ignored as it's features are basic and make for an excellent backup possibility.
OXYGEN/THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
A conglomeration of tile oxygen supply system and tile thermal control
system will complete two tasks at once, and reduce the mass and complexity
associated with redundant systems. This system will consist of a heat exchanger
placed after the filtering system, modifying tile temperature of tile incoming air
prior to it being pumped into the habitable area.
As" a major modification, this conglomerate alternative adds to tile complexity
of the oxygen supply system. By retaining simplicity for the oxygen supply
system, the quality of efficiency and other specified goals are enhanced. The
implementation of the conglomeration does not allow for desirable reliability, safety
and efficiency and is therefore rejected as a viable alternative.
FIRE CONTROL
A safety, as well as all ergonomic feature, is to have panels covering tile
tubing in the shelter. A thin sheet of material that is durable and insulative may
safely protect the astronauts from the cold tubing in the shelter, but not hinder the
heat transfer characteristics of the TCS.
This coolant design satisfactorily meets the specified requirements for the
coolant system. Therefbre, it is a acceptable solution.
FIRE CONTROL
CONTENTS
Alternative Solutions
Selection of Solutions
Fire Control Design
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
Detection
Heat detectors operate when a certain temperature is reached or the
temperature rises abnormally quickly due to the heat from the fire.
Fusible Links are made of a soft metal alloy that melts at high temperatures
to activate a detection circuit.
Glass bulbs are filled with a liquid or solid material that expands readily
when the temperature rises, breaking the bulb.
Photoelectric cells detect the presence of smoke in the surrounding air.
Infrared beams waver due to variations in air temperature. These changes
can be detected by a receiving grid.
Suppression
Water extinguishers operate by squeezing two levers together, which releases
the water. The water may be continually pressurized by dry air or nitrogen
(maintained pressure type) or by carbon dioxide stored in a small pressure cylinder
within the extinguisher shell.
Foam extinguishers use a stabilized protein or synthetic foam liquid mixed
with water to be discharged as a solution to an aspirating nozzle where air is
introduced to form a foam.
Dry chemical extinguishers discharge a variety of special, easy flow powders
as high velocity streams to inhibit flame chain reaction.
Carbon dioxide extinguishers consist of a high pressure gas container filled
with liquid CO2 which is discharged via a tapered horn to form a vaporized cloud
of inert gas.
Halon extinguishers generally use bromochlorodifluoromethane (BCF). This
is stored as a liquid and is usually pressurized to 145 psi (10 bar) to be discharged
as a long-reach jet before expanding into a heavy flame-inhibiting vapor.
Sprinkler systems consist of pipes placed near the ceiling, with sprinkler
heads placed at intervals along them. The heads are sealed off with fusible links,
or small glass bulbs. When the links melt or bulbs break, the heads are opened
releasing water, foam or inert gas.
SELECTION
Detection
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N indicates No
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The best choice as a detection device is photoelectric cells. The only 'no'
answer received for the photoelectric cell is due to its capacity to detect smoke
rather than heat. For the purposes of the LSES, this is warranted.
Suppression:
Y indicates Yes
N indicates No
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The best choice as a suppression device is a carbon dioxide extinguisher.
The only 'No' answer received for the carbon dioxide extinguisher is due to its
inability to extinguish metal fires. For the purposes of the LSES, this is acceptable.
FIRE CONTROL DESIGN
An important safety concern in the design of the LSES is the control of fire
hazards. The fire detection and suppression system consists of photoelectric cells
mounted within the ventilation system. These cells can be used in conjunction with
the filtering system to detect the presence of smoke in the circulated air. The
ability of the photoelectric cells to detect smoke rather than temperature variation
is important. The temperature of the cabin may not be extremely stable due to the
lunar enviromnent, and abnormal increases in temperature which might
inadvertently trigger an alarm if the detection device was heat dependant.
The greatest fire hazard stems from the electronic circuitry aboard the shelter.
Therefore, separate photoelectric cells are strategically positioned within the circuit
panels of the electronic equipment to immediately detect an electrical fire. All of
the photoelectric cells throughout the shelter are linked to the automatic fire
detection unit which operates on its own circuitry. If smoke is detected, the fire
detection panel indicates which photoelectric cell has been triggered.
The cryogenic expulsion operation is shutdown when a fire is detected, and
the back-up safety system is utilized. A carbon dioxide extinguisher is utilized to
eliminate the fire. When the contaminated air is evacuated, operation of the
cryogenic expulsion system is resumed.
AIREOCK HATCH
AIRLOCK HATCH
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REQUIREMENTS FOR AIRLOCK HATCH
Tile airlock door should provide adequate radiation protection lbr the
astronauts inside. In order to achieve this, the door must be made a specific
thickness depending upon the type of material used.
Tile airlock door should minimize weight, but at the same time maximize
entry area. Thus, a lighter door that must be made two feet thick may not be the
most advantageous choice.
Tile airlock door should be reliable. The hatch should therefore have a
simple overall design and a fail-safe locking mechanism.
In order to provide adequate radiation protection, the door will inevitably be
quite massive. Therefore, the door should be designed so that it can be opened and
closed using minimal force.
Tile airlock door must be hinged to a foundation capable of supporting the
weight of the door.
The pressure hatch must be capable of withstanding the pressure differential
of vacuum and normal Earth atmosphere (14.7 psi).
The pressure hatch opening must accommodate an astronaut wearing a full
space suit.
No protrusions should exist that may damage an astronauts space suit.
The size of the hatch should be designed so that a visual safety check can
be made to ensure it is secured properly.
The airlock door should provide a lock/unlock lever on the inside and outside
of the shelter in order to allow the door to be opened from either side.
The airlock door should utilize a proven sealing material to create an airtight
fit between the door and the frame.
A safety release pressure valve should exist that will allow tile cabin to be
depressurized. Such a valve is important in case the primal7 system malfunctions
and the astronauts cannot depressurize the shelter.
In order to see inside or outside the shelter, a window should be used. Such
a window would help minimize claustrophobia and allow rescuers to see inside the
shelter in order to determine the condition of the astronauts in the event they are
incapacitated.
The shelter's aft section should pennit a rescue vehicle to dock with it
thereby allowing direct access to the shelter. Once docked, a zero pressure
differential would exist between the inside and outside of the shelter's door
allowing the shelter's hatch to be easily opened.
In case the airlock door's latching mechanism fails, the shelter should be
outfitted with an alternate means of escape.
STATUS OF REQUIREMENTS
FOR AIRLOCK HATCH
Requirement
Adequate radiation protection
Hatch maximizes entrv area
and minimizes weight
Reliable
Minimal force to open and close
Strong foundation onto which the
used to hatch door is hinged
Status
Met: Tile door will be made out of
4 inch thick aluminum. Its mass
will be 345 kg [see appendix E].
Met: The door made from
will only be 4 inches thick compared
to 15.7 inches thick for an aluminum
and regolith door. The mass is also
minimized using a solid aluminum
door rather than an aluminum and
regolith door; 345 kg versus 502 kg
[see appendix E].
Met: The hatch is made of solid
aluminum providing adequate
radiation protection at all times. The
door utilizes a simple locking
mechanism that does not depend on
a motor to open or close it. See
hatchway specification drawing.
Met: The door is mounted on three
hinges hatch which allows the hatch
to swing horizontally. Due to the
size of the door, sufficient torque
can be applied that will allow the
door to move freely.
Met: A four inch aluminum wall is
support the 345 kg door. At the
same time, the aft aluminum wall
protects the astronauts from the
radiation from large solar flares.
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INTERNAL LAYOUT
Requirement Status
Hatch must withstand a 14.7 psi
pressure differential
Pressure hatch opening large
enough to accommodate astronaut
with space suit
Design of hatch and hatchway
should minimize the number of
protrusions that may snag astro-
nauts spacesuit
Allow enough room at the
airlock door for a safety check
Lock/unlock lever on the inside
and outside of the shelter
Use of a proven sealing material
to create an airtight fit
Use of a safety release pressure
valve
Met: The material and dimensions
used to construct the hatch can
withstand a 14.7 psi pressure
differential. In addition, the hatch
has been designed to swing inward
into the shelter so that sealing is
assisted by cabin pressure.
Met: Refer to hatchway specs, for
the dimensions of hatchway.
Met: All sharp edges have been
rounded. The hatchway has been
made large enough to accommodate
astronauts wearing spacesuits.
Met
Met: Referring to interior and
exterior drawings, a lock/unlock
lever is used on both sides of the
airlock door.
Met: Around the entire door, a
polymer is used to create an airtight
seal.
Met: In the exterior and interior
drawings, a safety release pressure
valve is depicted. The needle valve
allows the astronauts to vary the rate
at which cabin pressure reduced.
Requirement
Use of a window
Design of a docking mechanism for
a rescue vehicle
Alternate means of escape
Status
Met: Tile window is made of glass
and integrated into tile design of the
door, as can be seen ill the exterior
drawing. A crank-down lead shield
is used for additional radiation
protection. The lead shield call be
raised and lowered from the outside
by rescue persomlel by turning an
external hexagonal socket with a
crank (see interior drawing).
Met: A circular lip that extends
slightly outward is used about the aft
section of the shelter, see interior
drawing and cross section of
hatchway. The lip contains mating
grooves which allow a compatible
airlock on an emergency vehicle to
attach onto the shelter. As a result,
pressurized passageway exists
between the shelter and the
emergency vehicle.
Met: Explosive latches are used to
allow the crew an alternate means of
escape if the latching mechanism
fails.
